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Abstract
Information is a precise concept that can be defined mathematically, but its re-
lationship to what we call “knowledge” is not always made clear. Furthermore, the
concepts “entropy” and “information”, while deeply related, are distinct and must be
used with care, something that is not always achieved in the literature. In this elemen-
tary introduction, the concepts of entropy and information are laid out one by one,
explained intuitively, but defined rigorously. I argue that a proper understanding of
information in terms of prediction is key to a number of disciplines beyond engineering,
such as physics and biology.
1 Entropy: In the Eye of the Beholder
Information is a central concept in our daily life. We rely on information in order to
make sense of the world: to make “informed” decisions. We use information technology in
our daily interactions with people and machines. Even though most people are perfectly
comfortable with their day-to-day understanding of information, the precise definition of
information, along with its properties and consequences, is not always as well understood.
I want to argue in this comment that a precise understanding of the concept of information
is crucial to a number of scientific disciplines. Conversely, a vague understanding of the
concept can lead to profound misunderstandings, within daily life and within the technical
scientific literature. My purpose is to introduce the concept of information–mathematically
defined–to a broader audience, with the express intent of eliminating a number of common
misconceptions that have plagued the progress of information science in different fields.
∗The present comment was adapted from a blog series by the author, with the same title. It is meant
to be an elementary introduction to information theory for non-experts that assumes no prior exposure to
the subject. The tone is deliberately conversational, and no effort is made to cite the primary literature.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
1.
06
17
6v
1 
 [n
lin
.A
O]
  2
2 J
an
 20
16
What is information? Simply put, information is that which allows you (who is in
possession of that information) to make predictions with accuracy better than chance.
Even though the former sentence appears glib, it captures the concept of information fairly
succinctly. But the concepts introduced in this sentence need to be clarified. What do I
mean with prediction? What is “accuracy better than chance”? Predictions of what?
We all understand that information is useful. When is the last time that you have found
information to be counterproductive? Perhaps it was the last time you watched the News.
I will argue that, when you thought that the information you were given was not useful,
then what you were exposed to was most likely not information. That stuff, instead, was
mostly entropy (with a little bit of information thrown in here or there). Entropy, in case
you have not yet come across the term, is just a word we use to quantify how much isn’t
known.
“But, isn’t entropy the same as information?”
One of the objectives of this comment is to make the distinction between the two as clear
as possible. Information and entropy are two very different objects. They may have been
used synonymously (even by Claude Shannon–the father of information theory–thus being
responsible in part for a persistent myth) but they are fundamentally different. If the only
thing you will take away from this article is your appreciation of the difference between
entropy and information, then I will have succeeded.
But let us go back to our colloquial description of what information is, in terms of
predictions. “Predictions of what”? you should ask. Well, in general, when we make
predictions, they are about a system that we don’t already know. In other words, an other
system. This other system can be anything: the stock market, a book, the behavior of
another person. But I’ve told you that we will make the concept of information mathe-
matically precise. In that case, I have to specify this “other system” as precisely as I can.
I have to specify, in particular, which states the system can take on. This is, in most cases,
not particularly difficult. If I’m interested in quantifying how much I don’t know about
a phone book, say, I just need to tell you the number of phone numbers in it. Or, let’s
take a more familiar example (as phone books may appeal, conceptually, only to the older
crowd among us), such as the six-sided fair die. What I don’t know about this system is
which side is going to be up when I throw it next. What you do know is that it has six
sides. How much don’t you know about this die? The answer is not six. This is because
information (or the lack thereof) is not defined in terms of the number of unknown states.
Rather, it is given by the logarithm of the number of unknown states.
“Why on Earth introduce that complication?”, you ask.
Well, think of it this way. Let’s quantify your uncertainty (that is, how much you don’t
know) about a system (System One) by the number of states it can be in. Say this is N1.
2
Imagine that there is another system (System Two), and that one can be in N2 different
states. How many states can the joint system (System One And Two Combined) be in?
Well, for each state of System One, there can be N2 number of states. So the total number
of states of the joint system must be N1×N2. But our uncertainty about the joint system
is not N1×N2. Our uncertainty adds, it does not multiply. And fortunately the logarithm
is that one function where the log of a product of elements is the sum of the logs of the
elements. So, the uncertainty (let’s call it H) about the system N1 ×N2 is the logarithm
of the number of states
H(N1N2) = log(N1N2) = log(N1) + log(N2).
Let’s return to the six-sided die. You know, the type you’ve known most of your life. What
you don’t know about the state of this die (your uncertainty) before throwing the die is log 6.
When you peek at the number that came up, you have reduced your uncertainty (about
the outcome of this throw) to zero. This is because you made a perfect measurement. (In
an imperfect measurement, you only got a glimpse of the surface that rules out a “1” and
a “2”, say.)
What if the die wasn’t fair? Well that complicates things. Let us for the sake of the
argument assume that the die is so unfair that one of the six sides (say, the “six”) can never
be up. You might argue that the a priori uncertainty of the die (the uncertainty before
measurement) should now be log 5, because only five of the states can be the outcome of
the measurement. But how are you supposed to know this? You were not told that the
die is unfair in this manner, so as far as you are concerned, your uncertainty is still log 6.
Absurd, you say? You say that the entropy of the die is whatever it is, and does not
depend on the state of the observer? Well I’m here to say that if you think that, then you
are mistaken. Physical objects do not have an intrinsic uncertainty. I can easily convince
you of that. You say the fair die has an entropy of log 6? Let’s look at an even more
simple object: the fair coin. Its entropy is log 2, right? What if I told you that I’m playing
a somewhat different game, one where I’m not just counting whether the coin comes up
heads or tails, but am also counting the angle that the face has made with a line that points
towards True North. And in my game, I allow four different quadrants, like in Fig. 1 below.
Suddenly, the coin has 2×4 possible states, just because I told you that in my game the
angle that the face makes with respect to a circle divided into 4 quadrants is interesting
to me. It’s the same coin, but I decided to measure something that is actually measurable
(because the coin’s faces can be in different orientation, as opposed to, say, a coin with
a plain face but two differently colored sides). And you immediately realize that I could
have divided the circle into as many quadrants as I can possibly resolve by eye.
All right, fine, you say, so the entropy is log(2×N) where N is the number of resolvable
angles. But you know, what is resolvable really depends on the measurement device you
are going to use. If you use a microscope instead of your eyes, you could probably resolve
many more states. Actually, let’s follow this train of thought. Let’s imagine I have a very
sensitive thermometer that can sense the temperature of the coin. When throwing it high
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Figure 1: A fair coin with entropy log2 8 = 3 bits. In the figure on the left, the outcome is
“Tails, quadrant II”, while the coin on the right landed as “Heads, quadrant I”.
(the coin, not the thermometer) the energy the coin absorbs when hitting the surface will
raise the temperature of the coin slightly, compared to a coin that was tossed gently. If I
so choose, I could include this temperature as another characteristic, and now the entropy
is log(2×N ×M), where M is the number of different temperatures that can be reliably
measured by the device. And now you realize that I can drive this to the absurd, by
deciding to consider the excitation states of the molecules that compose the coin, or of the
atoms composing the molecules, or nuclei, the nucleons, or even the quarks and gluons.
The entropy of a physical object, it dawns on you, is not defined unless you tell me which
degrees of freedom are important to you. In other words, it is defined by the number of
states that can be resolved by the measurement that you are going to be using to determine
the state of the physical object. If it is heads or tails that counts for you, then log 2 is
your uncertainty. If you play the “4-quadrant” game, the entropy of the coin is log 8, and
so on. Which brings us back to six-sided die that has been mysteriously manipulated to
never land on “six”. You (who do not know about this mischievous machination) expect
six possible states, so this dictates your uncertainty. Incidentally, how do you even know
the die has six sides it can land on? You know this from experience with dice, and having
looked at the die you are about to throw. This knowledge allowed you to quantify your a
priori uncertainty in the first place. (I’ll discuss prior knowledge in much more detail in
the next section)
Now, you start throwing this weighted die, and after about twenty throws or so without
a “six” turning up, you start to become suspicious. You write down the results of a longer
set of trials, and still note this curious pattern of “six” never showing up, but you find that
the other five outcomes occur with roughly equal frequency. What happens now is that
you adjust your expectation. You now hypothesize (a posteriori) that it is a weighted die
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with five equally likely outcome, and one outcome that never actually occurs. Now your
expected uncertainty is log 5. (Of course, you can’t be 100% sure because you only took a
finite number of trials.)
But you did learn something through all these measurements. You gained information.
How much? Easy! It’s the difference between your uncertainty before you started to be
suspicious, minus the uncertainty after it dawned on you. The information you gained is
just log 6− log 5. How much is that? Well, you can calculate it yourself. You didn’t give me
the base of the logarithm you say? Well, that’s true. Without specifying the logarithm’s
base, the information gained is not specified. It does not matter which base you choose:
each base just gives units to your information gain. It’s kind of like asking how much you
weigh. Well, my weight is one thing. The number I give you depends on whether you want
to know it in kilograms, or pounds. Or stones, for all it matters.
If you choose the base of the logarithm to be 2, well then your units will be called “bits”
(which is what we all use in information theory land). But you may choose the Eulerian
e as your base. That makes your logarithms ”natural”, but your units of information
(or entropy, for that matter) will be called ”nats”. You can define other units, but we’ll
keep it at that for the moment. So, if you choose base 2 (bits), your information gain is
log2(6/5) ≈ 0.263 bits. That may not sound like much, but in a Vegas-type setting this
gain of information might be worth, well, a lot. Information that you have (and others do
not) can be moderately valuable (for example, in a stock market setting), or it could mean
the difference between life and death (in a predator/prey setting). In any case, we should
value information.
As an aside, this little example where we used a series of experiments to “inform” us that
one of the six sides of the die will not, in all likelihood, ever show up, should have convinced
you that we can never know the actual uncertainty that we have about any physical object,
unless the statistics of the possible measurement outcomes of that physical object are for
some reason known with infinite precision (which you cannot attain in a finite lifetime). It
is for that reason that I suggest to the reader to give up thinking about the uncertainty of
any physical object, and be only concerned with differences between uncertainties (before
and after a measurement, for example). The uncertainties themselves we call entropy.
Differences between entropies (for example before and after a measurement) are called
information. Information, you see, is real. Entropy on the other hand, is in the eye of the
beholder.
2 The Things We Know
In the first section I have written mostly about entropy. How the entropy of a physical
system (such as a die, a coin, or a book) depends on the measurement device that you will
use for querying that system. That, come to think of it, the uncertainty (or entropy) of any
physical object really is infinite, and made finite only by the finiteness of our measurement
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devices. Of course the things you could possibly know about any physical object is infinite!
Think about it! Look at any object near to you. OK, the screen in front of you. Just
imagine a microscope zooming in on the area framing the screen, revealing the intricate
details of the material. The variations that the manufacturing process left behind, making
each and every computer screen (or iPad or iPhone), essentially unique. If this was a more
formal article (as opposed to a comment), I would now launch into a discussion of how
there is a precise parallel (really!) to renormalization in quantum field theory... but it
isn’t. So, let’s instead delve head-first into the matter at hand, to prepare ourselves for a
discussion of the concept of information.
What does it even mean to have information? Yes, of course, it means that you know
something. About something. Let’s make this more precise. I’ll conjure up the old “urn”.
The urn has things in it. You have to tell me what they are. So, now imagine that.....
“Hold on, hold on. Who told you that the urn has things in it? Isn’t that information
already? Who told you that?”
OK, fine, good point. But you know, the urn is really just a stand-in for what we call
”random variables” in probability theory. A random variable is a “thing” that can take on
different states. Kind of like the urn, that you draw something from? When I draw a blue
ball, say, then the “state of the urn” is blue. If I draw a red ball, then the “state of the
urn” is red. So, “urn=random variable”. OK?
“OK, fine, but you haven’t answered my question. Who told you that there are blue and
red balls in it? Who?”
Let me think about that. Here’s the thing. When a mathematician defines a random
variable, they tell you which state it can take on, and with what probability. Like: “A
fair coin is a random variable with two states. Each state can be taken on with equal
probability one-half.” When they give you an urn, they also tell you how likely it is to get
a blue or a red ball from it. They just don’t tell you what you will actually get when you
pull one out.
“But is this how real systems are? That you know the alternatives before asking
questions?”
All right, all right. I’m trying to teach you information theory, the way it is taught in
any school you would set your foot in. I concede, when I define a random variable, then
I tell you how many states it can take on, and what the probability is that you will see
each of these states, when you “reach into the random variable”. Let’s say that this info
is magically conferred upon you. Happy now?
“Not really.”
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OK, let’s just imagine that you spend a long time with this urn, and after a while of
messing with it, you realize that:
A) This urn has balls in it.
B) From what you can tell, they are blue and red.
C) Reds occur more frequently than blues, but you’re still working on what the ratio is.
Is this enough?
“At least now we’re talking. Do you know that you assume a lot when you say ”random
variable?”
All right, you’re making this more difficult than I intended it to be. According to standard
lore, it appears that you’re allowed to assume that you know something about the things
you know nothing about. Let’s just call these things “common sense”. Like, that a coin
has two sides. Or an urn that has red and blue balls in it. They could be any pair of
colors, you do realize. And the things you don’t know about the random variable are the
things that go beyond common sense. The things that, unless you had performed dedicated
experiments to ascertain the state of the variables, you wouldn’t already know.
How much don’t you know about it? Easily answered using our good buddy Shannon’s
insight. How much you don’t know is quantified by the “entropy” of the urn. That’s
calculated from the fraction of blue balls known to be in the urn, and the fraction of red
balls in the urn. You know, these fractions that are common knowledge. So, let’s say that
fraction of blue is p. The fraction of red then is of course (you do the math) 1 − p. And
the entropy of the urn is
H(X) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) . (1)
In the first section you wrote that the entropy is logN , where N is the number of states
of the system. Are you changing definitions on me?
I’m not, actually. I just used a special case of the entropy to get across the point that the
uncertainty/entropy is additive. It was the special case where each possible state occurs
with equal likelihood. In that case, the probability p is equal to 1/N , and the above formula
(1) turns into the first one. But let’s get back to our urn. I mean random variable. And
let’s try to answer the question:
”How much is there to know (about it)?”
Assuming that we know the common knowledge stuff that the urn only has read and blue
balls in it, then what we don’t know is the identity of the next ball that we will draw.
This drawing of balls is our experiment. We would love to be able to predict the outcome
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of this experiment exactly, but in order to pull off this feat, we would have to have some
information about the urn. I mean, the contents of the urn.
If we know nothing else about this urn, then the uncertainty is equal to the log of the
number of possible states, as I wrote before. Because there are only red and blue balls,
that would be log 2. And if the base of the log is two, then the result is log2 2 = 1 bit.
So, if there are red and blue balls only in an urn, then I can predict the outcome of an
experiment (pulling a ball from the urn) just as well as I can predict whether a fair coin
lands on heads or tails. If I correctly predict the outcome (I will be able to do this about
half the time, on average) I am correct purely by chance. Information is that which allows
you to make a correct prediction with accuracy better than chance, which in this case
means, more than half of the time.
“How can you do this for the case of the fair coin, or the urn with equal numbers of red
and blue balls?”
Well, you can’t unless you cheat. I should say, the case of the urn and of the fair coin are
somewhat different. For the fair coin, I could use the knowledge of the state of the coin
before flipping, and the forces acting on it during the flip, to calculate how it is going to
land, at least approximately. This is a sophisticated way to use extra information to make
predictions (the information here is the initial condition of the coin) but something akin to
that has been used by a bunch of physics grad students to predict the outcome of casino
roulette in the late 70s (you can read about it in [1].)
The coin is different from the urn because for the urn you won’t be able to get any
“extraneous” information. But suppose the urn has blue and red balls in unequal propor-
tions. If you knew what these proportions were [the p and 1−p in Eq. (1) above] then you
could reduce the uncertainty of 1 bit to H(X). A priori (that is, before performing any
measurements on the probability distribution of blue and read balls), the distribution is of
course given by p = 1/2, which is what you have to assume in the absence of information.
That means your uncertainty is 1 bit. But keep in mind (from section 1) that it is only
one bit because you have decided that the color of the ball (blue or red) is what you are
interested in predicting.
If you start drawing balls from the urn (and then replacing them, and noting down the
result, of course) you would be able to estimate p from the frequencies of blue and red
balls. So, for example, if you end up seeing 9 times as many red balls as blue balls, you
should adjust your prediction strategy to “The next one will be red”. And you would likely
be right about 90% of the time, quite a bit better than the 50/50 prior.
“So what you are telling me, is that the entropy formula (1) assumes a whole lot of
things, such as that you already know to expect a bunch of things, namely what the
possible alternatives of the measurement are, and even what the probability distribution is,
which you can really only know if you have divine inspiration, or else made a ton of
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measurements!”
Yes, dear reader, that’s what I’m telling you. Well, actually, instead of divine inspiration
you might want to use a theory. Theories can sometimes constrain probability distributions
in such a way that you know certain things about them before making any measurements,
that is, theory can shape your prior expectation. For example, thermodynamics tells you
something about the probability distribution of molecules in a container filled with gas,
say, and knowing things like the temperature of that gas allows you to make predictions
better than chance. But even in the absence of that, you already come equipped with some
information about the system you are interested in (built into your common sense) and
if you can predict with accuracy better than chance (because for example somebody told
you the p of the probability distribution and it is not one half), then you have some extra
information. And yes, most people won’t tell you that. But if you want to know about
information, you first need to know.... what it is that you already know.
3 Everything is conditional
Let us take a few steps back for a second to contemplate the purpose of this article. I believe
that Shannon’s theory of information is a profound addition to the canon of theoretical
physics. Yes, I said theoretical physics. I can’t get into the details of why I think this
here (but if you are wondering about this you can find my musings here [2]). But if this
theory is so fundamental (as I claim) then we should make an effort to understand the basic
concepts in walks of life that are not strictly theoretical physics. I tried this for molecular
biology [3], and evolutionary biology [4].
But even though the theory of information is so fundamental to several areas of science,
I find that it is also one of the most misunderstood theories. It seems, almost, that
because “everybody knows what information is”, a significant number of people (including
professional scientists) use the word, but do not bother to learn the concepts behind it.
But you really have to. You end up making terrible mistakes if you don’t. The theory of
information, in the end, teaches you to think about knowledge, and prediction. I’m trying
to give you the entry ticket to all that.
Here’s the quick synopsis of what we have learned in the first two sections:
1.) It makes no sense to ask what the entropy of any physical system is. Because
technically, it is infinite. It is only when you specify what questions you will be asking (by
specifying the measurement device that you will use in order to determine the state of the
random variable in question) that entropy (a.k.a. uncertainty) is finite, and defined.
2.) When you are asked to calculate the entropy of a mathematical (as opposed to
physical) random variable, you are usually handed a bunch of information you didn’t
realize you have. Like, what’s the number of possible states to expect, what those states
are, and possibly even what the likelihood is of experiencing those states. But given those,
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your prime directive is to predict the state of the random variable as accurately as you
can. And the more information you have, the better your prediction is going to be.
Now that we’ve got these preliminaries out of the way, it seems like high time that
we get to the concept of information in earnest. I mean, how long can you dwell on the
concept of entropy, really? Actually, just a bit longer as it turns out.
I think I confused you a bit in the first two sections. One time, I write that the entropy
is just logN , the logarithm of the number of states the system can take on, and later I
write Shannon’s formula for the entropy of random variable X that can take on states xi
with probability pi as
H(X) = −
N∑
i=1
pi log pi . (2)
Actually, to be perfectly honest, I didn’t even write that formula. I wrote one where there
are only two states, that is, N = 2 in Eq. (2). And then I went on to tell you that the
expression logN was “just a special case” of Equation (1). But I think I need to clear up
what happened here.
In section 2, I talked about the fact that you really are given some information when a
mathematician defines a random variable. Like, for example, in Eq. (2) above. If you know
nothing about the random variable, you don’t know the pi. You may not even know the
range of i. If that’s the case, we are really up the creek, with paddle in absentia. Because
you wouldn’t even have any idea about how much you don’t know. So in the following,
let’s assume that you know at least how many states to expect, that is, you know N . If
you don’t know anything else about a probability distribution, then you have to assume
that each state appears with equal probability. Actually, this isn’t a law or anything. I
just don’t know how you would assign probabilities to states if you have zero information.
Nada. You just have to assume that your uncertainty is maximal in that case. And this
happens to be a celebrated principle: the “maximum entropy principle”. The uncertainty
(2) is maximized if pi = 1/N for all i. And if you plug in pi = 1/N in (2), you get
Hmax = logN . (3)
It’s that simple. So let me recapitulate. If you don’t know the probability distribution,
the entropy is (3). If you do know it, it is (2). The difference between the entropies is
knowledge1 The uncertainty (3) does not depend on knowledge, but the entropy (2) does.
1The statement that the most objective prior is the maximum-entropy one (implying that it is un-
informative) should be a little bit more technical than appears here, because if the probability distribution
of a random variable is known to be different than the uniform distribution, then the un-informative prior
is not the uniform distribution, but one that maximizes the entropy under the constraint of the likelihood
of the data given the probability distribution. This is discussed in Jaynes’s book [5], and cases where a
seemingly un-informative (uniform) prior clashes with the underlying probability distribution to make it
actually informative, are discussed in [6, 7].
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On a more technical note, Eq. (3) is really just like the entropy in statistical physics when
using the microcanonical ensemble, while Eq. (2) is the Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy in the
canonical ensemble, where the pi are given by the Boltzmann distribution. If you have
noticed that I’ve been using the words “entropy” and “uncertainty” interchangeably, I did
this on purpose because they are one and the same thing here. You should use one or the
other interchangeably too. But you should never say “information” when you don’t know
what you can predict with the entropy at hand.
So, getting back to the narrative, one of the entropies is conditional on knowledge,
while another is not. But, you think while scratching your head, wasn’t there something
in Shannon’s work about “conditional entropies”? Indeed, and those are the subject of
this section. The section title kind of gave it away, I’m afraid. To introduce conditional
entropies more formally, and then connect to (2), we first have to talk about conditional
probabilities. What’s a conditional probability? I know, some of you groan “I’ve known
what a conditional probability is since I was seven!” But even you may learn something.
After all, you learned something reading this article even though you’re somewhat of an
expert? Right? Why else would you still be reading?
“Infinite patience”, you say? Moving on.
A conditional probability characterizes the likelihood of an event, when another event has
happened at the same time. So, for example, there is a (generally small) probability that
you will crash your car. The probability that you will crash your car while you are texting
at the same time is considerably higher. On the other hand, the probability that you
will crash your car while it is Tuesday at the same time is probably unchanged, that is,
unconditional on the “Tuesday” variable. (Unless Tuesday is your texting day, that is.)
So, the probability of events depends on what else is going on at the same time. “Duh”,
you say. But while this is obvious, understanding how to quantify this dependence is key
to understanding information. In order to quantify the dependence between “two things
that happen at the same time”, we just need to look at two random variables. In the case
I just discussed, one variable is the likelihood that you will crash your car, and the other is
the likelihood that you will be texting. The two are not always independent, you see. The
problems occur when the two occur simultaneously. You know, if this was another article
(like, the type where I veer off to discuss topics relevant only to theoretical physicists)
I would now begin to remind you that the concept of simultaneity is totally relative, so
that the concept of a conditional probability cannot even be unambiguously defined in
relativistic physics (but concepts such as “before” and “after” can, so that helps a lot).
But this is not that article, so I will just let it go.
OK, here we go: X is one random variable (think: pi is the likelihood that you crash
your car while you conduct maneuver X = xi, where each xi is a particular maneuver or
action). The other random variable is Y . That variable has only two states: either you
are texting (Y = 1), or you are not (Y = 0) And those two states have probabilities q1
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(texting) and q0 (not texting) associated with them. I can then write down the formula
for the uncertainty of crashing your car while texting, using the probability distribution
P (X = xi|Y = 1) . (4)
This you can read as “the probability that random variable X is in state xi given that, at
the same time, random variable Y is in state Y = 1.” This vertical bar “|” is always read
as “given”.
So, let me write P (X = xi|Y = 1) as p(i|1). It’s much simpler that way. I can also
define P (X = xi|Y = 0) = p(i|0). p(i|1) and p(i|0) are two probability distributions that
may be different (but they don’t have to be if my driving is unaffected by texting). Fat
chance for the latter, by the way.
I can then write the entropy while texting as
H(X|texting) = −
N∑
i=1
p(xi|1) log p(xi|1) . (5)
On the other hand, the entropy of the driving variable while not texting is
H(X|not texting) = −
N∑
i=1
p(xi|0) log p(xi|0) . (6)
Now, compare Eqs. (5) and (6) to Eq. (2). The latter two are conditional entropies,
conditional in this case on the co-occurrence of another event, here texting. They look just
like the Shannon formula for entropy, which I told you was the one where “you already
knew something”, like the probability distribution. In the case of (5) and (6), you know
exactly what it is that you know, namely whether random variable X is texting while
driving, or not.
So here’s the gestalt idea that I want to get across. Probability distributions are born
being uniform. In that case, you know nothing about the variable, except perhaps the
number of states it can take on. Because if you didn’t know that, then you wouldn’t even
know how much you don’t know. That would be the “unknown unknowns”, that a certain
political figure once injected into the national discourse.
These probability distributions become non-uniform (that is, some states are more likely
than others) once you acquire information about the states. This information is manifested
by conditional probabilities. You really only know that a state is more or less likely than the
random expectation if you at the same time know something else (like in the case discussed,
whether the driver is texting or not). Put in another way, what I’m trying to tell you here
is that any probability distribution that is not uniform (same probability for all states)
is necessarily conditional. When someone hands you such a probability distribution, you
may not know what it is conditional about. But I assure you that it is conditional. I’ll
state it as a theorem:
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All probability distributions that are not uniform are in fact conditional
probability distributions.
This is not what your standard textbook will tell you, but it is the only interpretation of
“what do we know” that makes sense to me. “Everything is conditional” thus, as the title
of this section promised.
We can also write down what the average uncertainty for crashing your car is, given
your texting status. It is simply the average of the uncertainty while texting and the
uncertainty while not texting, weighted by the probability that you engage in any of the
two behaviors. Thus, the conditional entropy H(X|Y ), that is the uncertainty of crashing
your car given your texting status, is
H(X|Y ) = q0H(X|Y = 0) + q1H(X|Y = 1) . (7)
That’s obvious, right? q0 being the probability that you are texting while executing any
maneuver i, and q1 the probability that you are not (while executing any maneuver). With
this definition of the entropy of one random variable given another, we can now finally
tackle information.
4 Information
Before going on, let me quickly summarize the take-home points of sections 1-3.
1.) Entropy, also known as “uncertainty”, is something that is mathematically defined
for a “random variable”. But physical objects aren’t mathematical. They are messy
complicated things. They become mathematical when observed through the looking glass
of a measurement device that has a finite resolution. We then understand that a physical
object does not “have an entropy”. Rather, its entropy is defined by the measurement
device I choose to examine it with. Information theory therefore is a theory of the relative
state of measurement devices.
2.) Entropy, also known as uncertainty, quantifies how much you don’t know about
something (a random variable). But in order to quantify how much you don’t know, you
have to know something about the thing you don’t know. These are the hidden assumptions
in probability theory and information theory. These are the things you didn’t know you
knew.
3.) Shannon’s entropy is written in terms of “p log p”, but these “p” are really condi-
tional probabilities if you know that they are not uniform, that is, all p the same for all
states. They are not uniform given what else you know.
I previously defined the unconditional entropy, which is the one where we know nothing
about the system that the random variable describes. We call that Hmax, because an
unconditional entropy must be maximal: it tells us how much we don’t know if we don’t
know anything except how many states my measurement device has. Then there is the
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conditional entropy H = −∑i pi log pi, where the pi are conditional probabilities. They
are conditional on some knowledge. Thus, H tells you what remains to be known. So
finally, I give you:
Information is: “What you don’t know minus what remains to be known given what you
know”.
There it is. Clear?
“Hold on, hold on. Hold on for just a minute.”
What?
“This is not what I’ve been reading in textbooks.”
So tell me what it is that you read.
“It says there that the mutual information is the difference between the entropy of random
variable X, H(X), and the conditional entropy H(X|Y ), which is the conditional entropy
of variable X given you know the state of variable Y . Come to think of it, you yourself
defined that conditional entropy at the end of section 3. I think it is Equation (7) there!”
And there is this Venn diagram on Wikipedia. It looks like Figure 2!”
Figure 2: Entropy Venn diagram, showing conditional and mutual entropies of two vari-
ables. Source: Wikimedia
Ah, yes. That’s a good diagram. Two variables X and Y . The red circle represents
the entropy of X, the blue circle the entropy of Y . The purple thing in the middle is the
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shared entropy I(X : Y ), which is what X knows about Y . Also what Y knows about X.
They are the same thing.
“You wrote I(X : Y ) but Wiki says I(X;Y ). Is your semicolon key broken?”
Actually, there are two notations for the shared entropy (a.k.a information) in the literature.
One uses the colon, the other the semicolon. Thanks for bringing this up. It confuses
people. In fact, I wanted to bring up this other thing....
“Hold on again. You also keep on saying “shared entropy” when Wiki says “shared
information”. You really ought to pay more attention.”
Well, you. That’s a bit of a pet-peeve of mine. Just look at the diagram above. The
thing in the middle, the purple area, it’s a shared entropy. Information is shared entropy.
“Shared information” would be, like, shared shared entropy. I think that’s a bit ridiculous,
don’t you think?
“Well, if you put it like this. I see your point. But why do I read ‘shared information’
everywhere?”
That is, dear reader, because people are confused about what to call entropy, and what
to call information. A sizable fraction of the literature calls what we have been calling
“entropy” (or uncertainty) “information”. You can see this even in the book by Shannon
and Weaver [8] (which, come to think of it, was edited by Weaver, not Shannon). When
you do this, then what is shared by the “informations” is “shared information”. But that
does not make any sense, right?
“I don’t understand. Why would anybody call entropy ‘information’? Entropy is what you
don’t know, information is what you know. How could you possibly confuse the two?”
I’m with you there. Entropy is “potential information”. It quantifies “how much you could
possibly know”. But it is not what you actually know. I think, between you and me, that
it was just sloppy writing at first, which then ballooned into a massive misunderstanding.
Both entropy and information are measured in bits, and so people would just flippantly
say: “a coin has two bits of information”, when they mean to say “two bits of entropy”.
And it’s all downhill from there.
I think I’ve made my point here, I hope. Being precise about entropy and information
really matters. Colon vs. semicolon does not. Information is “unconditional entropy minus
conditional entropy”. When cast as a relationship between two random variables X and
Y , we can write it as
I(X : Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) . (8)
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And because information is symmetric in the one who measures and the one who is being
measured (remember: “a theory of the relative state of measurement devices”) this can
also be written as
I(X : Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) . (9)
And both formulas can be verified by looking at the Venn diagram above.
“OK, this is cool.”
”Hold on, hold on!”
What is it again?
“I just remembered. This was all a discussion that came after I brought up that
information was I(X : Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ), while you said it was Hmax −H, where the
H was clearly an entropy that you write as H = −∑i pi log pi. All you have to do is look
back a few pages, I’m not dreaming this!”
So you are saying that textbooks say
I = H(X)−H(X|Y ) (10)
while I write instead
I = Hmax −H(X) , (11)
where H(X) = −∑i pi log pi. Is that what you’re objecting to?
“Yes. Yes it is.”
Well, here it is in a nutshell. In (10), information is defined as the difference between the
actual observed entropy of X, minus the actual observed entropy of X given that I know
the state of Y (whatever that state may be). In (11), information is defined as what I don’t
know about X (without knowing any of the things that we may implicitly know already),
and the actual uncertainty of X, given a particular probability distribution that is non-
uniform. The latter entropy does not mention a system Y . It quantifies my knowledge
of X without stressing what it is that I know about X. If the probability distribution
with which I describe X is not uniform, then I do know something about X. My I in Eq.
(11) quantifies that. Eq. (10) quantifies what I know about X above and beyond what I
already know via Eq. (11), namely using my knowledge of Y . It quantifies specifically the
information that Y conveys about X. So you could say that the total information that I
have about X, given that I also know the state of Y , would be
Itotal = Hmax −H(X) + H(X)−H(X|Y ) = Hmax −H(X|Y ) . (12)
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So the difference between what I would write and what textbooks write is really only in
the unconditional term: it should be maximal. But in the end, Eqs. (10) and (11) simply
refer to different informations. Eq. (11) is information, but I may not be aware how I got
into possession of that information. Eq. (10) tells me exactly the source of my information:
the variable Y . Is it clear now?
“I’ll have to get back to you on that. I’m still reading. I think I have to read it again. It
sort of takes some getting used to.”
I know what you mean. It took me a while to get to that place. But, as I hinted at in the
introduction, it pays off big time to have your perspective adjusted, so that you know what
you are talking about when you say “information”. I have been (and will be) writing a good
number of articles that reference “information”, and many of those are a consequence of
research that was only possible when you understand the concept precisely. I wrote a series
of articles on information in black holes already [9–12]. That’s just the beginning. There
are others, for example on how to measure how much information is stored in DNA [13] or
proteins [14], and the relationship between information and cooperation [15–17] (I mean,
how you can fruitfully engage in the latter only if you have the former), and information
processing in the brain [18, 19]. And there are more to come, on information in DNA
binding sites [20] or even how to use information theory to estimate the likelihood of a
spontaneous origin of life [21]. I know it sounds more like a threat than a promise. I really
mean it to be a promise.
5 Epilogue
A kind reviewer brought to my attention an elegant and insightful article by E.T. Jaynes [22],
in which Jaynes not only accurately characterizes the difference between Boltzmann and
Gibbs thermodynamic entropies and derives thermodynamics’ second law, but also makes
essentially the same statement about entropy that I have made here, by writing:
“From this we see that entropy is an anthropomorphic concept, not only in the well-
known statistical sense that it measures the extent of human ignorance as to the microstate.
Even at the purely phenomenological level, entropy is an anthropomorphic concept. For it
is a property, not of the physical system, but of the particular experiments you or I choose
to perform on it.”
While this statement pertained to thermodynamics entropy, it applies just as well to
Shannon entropy as the two are intimately related. Jaynes dissects this relationship co-
gently in his article and I see no need to repeat it here as my focus is on information,
not entropy. I have written about the relationship between thermodynamic and Shannon
entropy [2] but wish I would have known Ref. [22] then. Perhaps this link is best summa-
rized by noting that thermodynamics is a special case of information theory where “all the
fast things have happened, but the slow things have not” (as Richard Feynman described
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thermodynamical equilibrium [23]). In other words, in equilibrium information about the
fast things has disappeared, but there may still be information about the slow things: that
’s the things we don’t always know we know.
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